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theory as the “dogma of the ghost in the machine,” but arguably
language actually does function in some ways like a ghost in a ma-
chine. Linguistic control systems enable human beings to tran-
scend individual experience and allow the contemplation of possi-
bilities that never have been, and never could be, experienced. It
also allows the symbolic sharing of experiences with others, includ-
ing others long dead: Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas. Ghosts, of a kind.
The Western tradition has often viewed logic and reason as
somehow superior to the passions we share with animals: Indeed,
“right conduct” is often viewed as involving the control of animal
passions. However, reason, logic, and organized social rules have
been at the core of some of the most violent and destructive of hu-
man behaviors, including the official directives, chains of com-
mand, and orderly bureaucratic procedures of the Holocaust. An
alternative is to view prosocial emotions of attachment and bond-
ing as being the truly effective counter to aggression and violence
(Buck 1988; 1999).
There is evidence of the importance of emotional bonds in me-
diating a variety of behaviors with moral implications: fostering co-
operation and altruism and reducing aggression and conflict. Ex-
amples of such emotional controls of behavior have been found in
conflict resolution among monkeys and apes, as observed by de
Waal and colleagues (e.g., de Waal 1996; de Waal & Aureli 1997).
In human beings, there is considerable evidence that feeling em-
pathy for a needy person leads to altruism, that is, to unselfish ten-
dencies to help that person (Eisenberg & Fabes 1991; Eisenberg
& Miller 1987; Hoffman 1975; 1976). C. Daniel Batson and col-
leagues (Batson & Oleson 1991; Batson & Shaw 1991) reviewed
evidence for the role of selfish motives in altruistic behavior and
advanced the empathy-altruism hypothesis (EAH): that the ex-
pression of needs by the other naturally evokes empathic emotions
of sympathy and compassion that motivate altruistic responses.
In a larger sense, the gulf between the approach of Rachlin and
that of Preston and de Waal reflects the gap between the Piaget-
Kohlberg analysis of moral judgment and the morality of caring
emphasized by Carol Gilligan. Gilligan and colleagues argued that
there are two fundamental moral orientations. The justice per-
spective “holds up an ideal of reciprocity and equal respect,”
whereas the care perspective “holds up an ideal of attention and
response to need” (Gilligan & Attanucci 1988, p. 73). Either or
both of these perspectives can be active during moral choice.
Moreover, there are suggestions that choice behavior per se is
more emotional than previously believed (Lowenstein et al. 2001).
Human behavior is multiply determined, and it arguably is an
error to dismiss another point of view because it is “not necessary”
to explain a phenomenon. All aspects of human empathy and al-
truism cannot be explained by the principles developed by Pres-
ton and de Waal (2002). However, an exclusive focus on choice can
leave out the emotional controls that may set the basic agenda for
human morality in general and altruism in particular.
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Abstract: There are three concerns regarding Rachlin’s altruism model.
First, proximal causal mechanisms such as those identified by cognitive
neuroscientists and behavioral neuropharmacologists are not emphasized.
Second, there is a lack of clear testable hypotheses. And third, extreme
forms of altruism are emphasized rather than common forms. We focus on
an overarching theme – proximal mechanisms of individual differences in
altruism.
Rachlin proposes a theory of altruism that focuses on self-control
as the central explanatory mechanism. Other notable aspects to
this model include the emphasis on temporal patterns of altruis-
tic behaviors and the connections made to evolutionary theory. Al-
though Rachlin is to be commended for elevating the importance
of these aspects to explain altruism, there are a number of gaps in
the model that seriously limit this theoretical perspective. These
limitations will likely decrease any impact his theory may have on
the field. We briefly outline some of these concerns and propose
avenues for future theoretical and empirical pursuit.
Psychological debate and research on altruism have often fo-
cused on the existence of altruism. Assuming the existence of al-
truism moves the debate to the nature of altruism. Accordingly, it
is important to place the issue of altruism in its broader context.
Altruism is considered to be a subset of the larger set of prosocial
behaviors (i.e., behaviors that benefit others) which include be-
haviors that primarily benefit others, often incurring a cost to the
self (Carlo & Randall 2001; Eisenberg & Fabes 1998). This defi-
nition requires one to acknowledge the presence of much varia-
tion in the forms of altruism. Our working definition is, of course,
subject to debate; but for the purpose of the present commentary,
it is necessary to make explicit. That is, our subsequent comments
regarding Rachlin’s model may be partly attributed to definitional
differences.
We have three recurring concerns regarding Rachlin’s altruism
model. First, virtually no time is spent on proximal causal mecha-
nisms such as those that might be provided by areas like cognitive
neuroscience and behavioral neuropharmacology. Second, there
is a lack of clear testable hypotheses that follow from this self-con-
trol model. Finally, the model appears to be built around extreme
forms of altruism (e.g., woman saving unknown baby) rather than
the more regularly occurring forms that vary widely in occurrence
across and within individuals. From our perspective, these con-
cerns are interrelated. Thus, this commentary will address these
issues by focusing on an overarching theme – proximal mecha-
nisms of individual differences in altruism.
An account of individual differences in altruism requires the
consideration of more proximal causal mechanisms. According to
some theorists (Carlo & Randall 2001; Eisenberg & Fabes 1998;
Hoffman 1991), individual differences in altruism can stem from
differences in cognitive, emotive, and social context (e.g., culture-
related socialization experiences). We will focus on a specific set
of emotive variables relevant to altruism. A number of investiga-
tors posit that empathy is the primary motivator associated with
altruism (Batson 1998; Carlo & Randall 2001; Eisenberg & Fabes
1998; Hoffman 1991). Empathy can be defined as an other-ori-
ented matching emotion that results from vicariously observing
another’s distress. There are two processes that may stem from
empathy: sympathy and personal distress. Sympathy is an other-
oriented vicarious emotional response that results in feelings of
sorrow or concern for a needy other. In contrast, personal distress
is a self-focused vicarious emotional response that results in aver-
sive, uncomfortable feelings. The difference between these two
empathy-related responses is critical because while sympathy can
result in prosocial behaviors (including altruism), personal distress
often results in avoidance behaviors (but see Batson 1998).
The characteristics of individuals who exhibit these different re-
sponses in distress situations are distinct. For example, empathy
and sympathy responses reflect moderate sympathetic arousal
whereas personal distress reflects over-arousal. Derryberry and
Rothbart (1988) proposed a temperament theory that identifies
two major dimensions: physiological reactivity and self-regula-
tion. Physiological reactivity refers primarily to affective arousal
and motor activity. It includes an assessment of emotional and be-
havioral threshold, latency, intensity, and rise and fall time. Self-
regulation refers to behavioral and emotional control. Specific 
aspects of this dimension include attentional processes, approach-
withdrawal, soothability, and behavioral inhibition (Rothbart et al.
1994). More important, Rothbart proposes that empathic and
prosocial tendencies are best explained by examining the interac-
tion between these two internal processes. Following Rothbart’s
model, personal distress responses are the joint consequences of
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individuals who have difficulty modulating their physiological
arousal and have overactive physiological reactivity; there is evi-
dence to support these assertions (Rothbart et al. 1994; see also
Eisenberg & Fabes 1998). Thus, Rothbart’s approach represents
a set of more proximal causal mechanisms that might account for
individual differences in altruism, and it also respects the wide
variations in altruism.
In contrast to Rothbart’s model, we are unable to find in Rach-
lin’s proposal an explicitly defined set of analogous proximal causal
agents. This situation is unfortunate in that such proximal mech-
anisms would help account for the wide variation seen in the forms
of altruistic behaviors, the individual differences seen between
and within individuals, and, arguably the most important point,
provide researchers with clear and testable hypotheses that avoid
circularity (Panksepp 1998). For example, Rothbart’s notion of
distress as a functional interaction between physiological reactiv-
ity (e.g., arousal) and self-regulation (e.g., emotional control) sug-
gests distinct neurophysiological processes (e.g., hypothalamic pi-
tuitary adrenal axis versus frontal cortical areas, respectively).
Notably, individual difference in distress, and hence likelihood of
behaving altruistically, becomes a product of these processes that
vary with evolutionary and individual history. The task of identify-
ing all neurobiological factors that mediate the presence or ab-
sence of an altruistic behavior at time x is daunting. However, it is
an obtainable goal that already has a basis from which to start.
Powerful animal models exist that could be used to explore the
processes posited to mediate altruism (e.g., distress). There are
numerous papers concerning rodent models, indicating that dif-
ferent experiences in early development (e.g., naturally occurring
maternal care) can differentially impact later sensitivity to distress
(e.g., alteration in hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis, see Liu et
al. 1997; for other examples, see Boksa et al. 1998; Dellu et al.
1996; Kehoe et al. 1998). An exciting possibility would be to merge
the work on individual difference with an animal model of self-
control that attempts to measure choice that includes prosocial
options (see Poulos et al. 1998 for an example of assessing indi-
vidual differences using a self-control [impulsivity] preparation).
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Abstract: Using a simple learning agent, we show that learning self-con-
trol in the primrose path experiment does parallel learning cooperation in
the prisoner’s dilemma. But Rachlin’s claim that “there is no essential dif-
ference between self-control and altruism” is too strong. Only iterated
prisoner’s dilemmas played against reciprocators are reduced to self-con-
trol problems. There is more to cooperation than self-control and even al-
truism in a strong sense.
As Rachlin points out, the analogy between self-control and altru-
ism has a long history. For example, Sidgwick (1893) and Nagel
(1970) use the analogy as a bridge from the natural appeal of pru-
dential motivation to a justification of altruism. These authors ar-
gued that since we stand to others as to our own future selves, we
should not treat the two cases differently. Rachlin moves the nor-
mative discussion from this weak appeal to rationality as symme-
try, to a productive blend of formal and empirical modeling meth-
ods.
Rachlin makes two significant contributions to the study of so-
cial cooperation. First, in a literature that has emphasized ratio-
nality and evolution, he focuses on agents learning to cooperate.
Second, he develops the analogy between learning self-control
and learning social cooperation by showing that two problems in
these areas share a common structure. The primrose path (PP) to
addiction is a problem for self-control and the prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) is a problem for cooperation because immediate reinforce-
ment is higher for the addictive choice, X, or the noncooperative
choice, D, respectively. Thus, each presents learners with a local
optimum trap. Rachlin argues that learners who structure rein-
forcement for patterns of acts rather than single acts can avoid
these traps.1
Although he offers much to build on, Rachlin’s claim that “there
is no essential difference between self-control and altruism” (tar-
get article, sect. 7, last para.) is too strong. Self-control may be nec-
essary for cooperation, but it is not sufficient; he underemphasizes
the crucial factor of reciprocity. That is, although Rachlin puts
great weight on reciprocity, the complexities of dealing with hu-
man self-control and cooperation obscure some issues. We pro-
pose to clarify the discussion by focusing on simple artificial agents
and games.
The main problem is that whereas a temporally extended agent
is the benefactor from her own self-control, this need not be the
case for cooperation. In the best case, cooperators share the ben-
efits with others; in the worse case, unreciprocated cooperation
harms the agent compared to her opponent. So we suspect that
self-control might be learnable by reinforcement under weaker
conditions. To test our intuition, we construct the simplest learner,
who tries two alternative acts and selects the one with the higher
immediate reinforcement; it will choose addictive X in the PP.
Even if we allow reinforcement to be remembered over trials, the
result is the same (Fig. 1). But if we constrain choice (and there-
fore reinforcement) to the simplest patterns, that is, to sets such
as XXX and YYY, Y is chosen (Fig. 2).2
Turning to the PD, we get parallel results. The act chooser will
learn to defect and the pattern chooser to cooperate. In Figure 3
the dark bars show Rachlin’s PD game iterated for 40 rounds with
a Learner playing against Tit-For-Tat. Performance increases with
pattern length up to 3, then decreases (because the longer defec-
tion trial is costly). But we will get this parallel only under restric-
tive conditions. First, the game must be iterated; in the one-shot
PD, D remains dominant. Rachlin notes that his subjects “are
making only one in a series of choices extending to their lives out-
side of the lecture hall” and claims that “for the teleological be-
haviorist there can be no social trap without repetition. All pris-
oner’s dilemmas are repeated “ (sect. 3, last para.). Be this as it may
for humans, we can impose the restriction explicitly for automata
and focus on repeated PD games. Second, learning to cooperate
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Figure 1 (Danielson).
